Hugo Chavez: Venezuela\u27s New Bandito or Zorro by Mielnik, Andy
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 14 | Number 3 Article 7
2008
Hugo Chavez: Venezuela's New Bandito or Zorro
Andy Mielnik
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Comment and Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andy Mielnik, Hugo Chavez: Venezuela's New Bandito or Zorro, 14 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 591 (2008)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol14/iss3/7
HUGO CHAVEZ: VENEZUELA'S NEW
BANDITO OR ZORRO?
Andy Mielnik*
I. INTRODUCTIONON 32,000 sprawling acres in central Venezuela, a British cattle
ranching corporation is struggling to retain legal ownership of its
ranch.I Approximately 1,000 landless peasants have taken ref-
uge on the unused acres of Hato El Charcote and are doing so under the
authorization of the Chavez administration.2 These squatters have initi-
ated their own form of adverse possession and are doing so at the ex-
pense of foreign investors like the Vestey Group.3 Due to recent
developments in Venezuela's new land reform program, the number of
cattle being raised at Hato El Charcote has fallen by half, and more for-
eign owned private property is being threatened. 4
While such a development may alarm individuals familiar with west-
ernized notions of property rights, viewing property rights under such a
mindset is impractical in most Latin American countries.5 "Any attempt
to alter the inegalitarian pattern of landholdings found in Latin America
necessarily implies shifting individual [property rights] in land, plus their
associated rents, from the relatively rich to the relatively poor. ' ' 6 Thus,
with the harsh reality of expropriation possibilities for many Latin Amer-
icans and foreign investors-coupled with the current state of disarray in
the area of international compensation for seized property-it is evident
that land reform programs will be an imminent threat for many landown-
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1. Jose de Cordoba, Chavez Charts a Land Route -Simplistic Redistribution Could




5. Frank Vogelgesang, After Land Reform, The Market?, in LAND REFORM - LAND
SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATIVES (1998/1) 20, 24 (P. Gruppo, ed., Food & Agric.
Org. of the U.N. 1998).
6. Id. at 24.
592 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
ers in the near future. 7
Land reform is a hot issue in many developing countries around the
world. From Zimbabwe to Cuba, many academics and foreign investors
alike view land reform as counter-productive and influenced by power-
hungry politicians who use these programs to stay in office. The aim of
this article is to describe the current land reform situation in Venezuela
and to provide a prediction as to its possibility of success or failure. To do
so, one must understand the current state of property ownership in Vene-
zuela as well as the Chavez administration's position regarding property
rights and social goals. In light of the goals, the article will relieve addi-
tional concerns and problems facing both proponents and opponents of
Chavez's plan.
While no land distribution program can ever be implemented in a vac-
uum, theory-based land reform programs should also be analyzed. These
ideal hypothetical land reform programs provide a benchmark that land
reform programs can be compared to. In addition to a cursory study of
the practical aims of a generic land reform program, the article will high-
light current land reform programs in other countries as well as respective
objectives and concerns regarding the programs. Finally, the article will
conclude with both a comparison of Venezuela's land reform program to
the ideal land reform program as well as a general prediction on the out-
look of the land reform program and its effect on the state of Venezuela.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF LAND OWNERSHIP
IN VENEZUELA
Land ownership is one of many fundamental rights recognized by the
international community. 8 According to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, "everyone has the right to own property" and to not "be
arbitrarily deprived of that property";9  on the other hand,
"[c]oncentrated ownership promotes neither efficiency nor equity." 10
While possession of these bundle of rights is a reality taken for granted in
most developed countries, millions of Venezuela's landless are trapped in
a vicious cycle of poverty and servitude." I Of private landholdings in the
country, roughly 80 percent is owned by 5 percent of the population. 12
7. Eduardo Moises Penalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International
Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107,
216 (2000).
8. Id. at 154.
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810, (Dec. 12, 1948) at art. 17.
10. John D. Montgomery, Prospects for International Action, in INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF LAND REFORM 221, 222 (John D. Montgomery, ed., Westview
Press 1984).
11. Gregory Wilpert, Collision in Venezuela, 21 NEW LEFT REV. 101, 108 (2003), avail-
able at http://newleftreview.orgl?getpdf=NLR25505.
12. Seth R. DeLong, More Like Lincoln Than Lenin - Land Reform in Venezuela,
COUNTERPUNCH, Feb. 26, 2005, http://www.counterpunch.org/delong02262005.
html.
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Additionally, "a mere 2 percent of the population owns 60 percent of the
country's farmland, much of which is fallow." 13
A. A BRIEF HISTORY ON LAND DISTRIBUTION IN VENEZUELA
The first wave of events that led to the disproportionate ownership of
land among the peasants can be traced back to regional military
strongmen and the large land estate bourgeoisie in the early twentieth
century.14 During the civil strife of landless peasants in Venezuela, land
ownership was primarily restricted to the military and local supporters of
the "personalistic dictatorial regime" of the time.15 Land tenancy and
urban squalor provided the only form of land ownership available for the
peasant-class during this time period. 16
After a succession of civil wars and government upheavals, the eco-
nomic focus of Venezuela shifted from agricultural development to min-
eral exploitation-providing the main reason for the "gross imbalance
between urban and rural populations" as well as the cause of the current
state of the landless peasant. 17 The government's shift to oil exploitation
had a devastating affect on agriculture and consequently put a hold on
any shift in land ownership to the peasants. 18 Moreover, the surge of oil
investment and employment created an economic paradox, called "Dutch
Disease," triggering a second wave of disproportionate land ownership
that continues to distress the local economy to this very day. 19 Dutch
Disease is simply defined as "the phenomenon of an economy slumping
as a direct result of a rapid spike in one of the sectors while the others
remain constant. '' 20 In Venezuela, Dutch Disease "practically destroyed
agricultural production" as the flood of foreign currency significantly
cheapened the cost of importing agricultural goods. 21
B. MISSION ZAMORA: THE NEW LAND REFORM
PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA
Echoing the free-land and free-men sentiments of Ezequiel Zamora,
President Hugo Chavez enacted Mission Zamora to address the landless-
ness of the masses as well as the harmful symptoms of Dutch Disease.22
13. Id.
14. Evelyne Huber & John D. Stephens, Conclusion: Agrarian Structure and Political
Power in Comparative Perspective, in AGRARIAN STRUCTURE & POLITICAL
POWER 183, 202-04 (Evelyne Huber & Frank Safford, eds., Univ. of Pittsburgh
Press 1995).
15. Id.
16. Gregory Wilpert, Land for People not for Profit in Venezuela, VENEZUELAANAL-
Ysis.CoM, Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=
1529.
17. DeLong, supra note 12.
18. Wilpert, supra note 16.
19. DeLong, supra note 12.
20. Id.
21. Wilpert, supra note 16.
22. Ezequial Zamora was a peasant leader famous for fighting against the oligarchy
after Venezuela's war of independence during the 19th century. While unsuccessful
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Promulgated under the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, Mission Zamora is becoming one of the most aggressive land distri-
bution programs in Venezuela's tumultuous history.23 The Mission's
main goal is "to reach equality and social equity fulfilling Article 307 of
the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. ' 24 By provid-
ing the landless peasants with land and the opportunity to cultivate it, the
Mission should curtail the extreme disproportion of land ownership in
Venezuela. But it is clear that the ultimate means of achieving these
goals will be tantamount to calling a war on latifundios25 and the inves-
tors that own these developments. 26
The authorization of this negative stance on latifundios is embedded in
article 307 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela:
The predominance of large land estates [latifundios] is contrary to
the interests of society. Appropriate tax law provisions shall be en-
acted to tax fallow lands and establish the necessary measures to
transform them into productive economic units, likewise recovering
arable land. Farmers and other agricultural producers are entitled to
own land, in the cases and forms specified under the pertinent law.
The State shall protect and promote associative and private forms of
property in such manner as to guarantee agricultural production.
The State shall see to the sustainable ordering of arable land to guar-
antee its food-producing potential.27
With such broad language prescribing the "recovering [of] arable land,"
coupled with the State's guarantee to provide the means to realize agri-
culturally efficient lands to the people, it is clear that the Chavez adminis-
tration will have the green light to use almost any means to achieve the
ends expressed in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela.28 As such, even land reform apologists are questioning the viabil-
ity of a land distribution program that threatens extremely productive
latifundios like Hato El Charcote.29 But the Chavez administration ada-
mantly defends its purported confiscations against investors, like the Ves-
tey Group, by giving them the opportunity "to show that the land is not
at reversing the unequal land distribution at the time, his legacy left an indelible
impression on President Chavez and has inspired his position on land and agrarian
reform. Today, Venezuelan land reformers still chant Zamora's infamous words:
Tierras y hombres libres (Free land and free men). Peter Lackowski, Revolution-
ary Radio in Venezuela, VENEZUELAANALYSIS.COM, Jun. 2, 2006, http://www.
venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1757.
23. Wilpert, supra note 16.
24. Embassy of Venezuela in the United States, Social Missions, http://www.embave
nez-us.org/index.php?pagina=pag-misiones-intro.php&titulo=social%20Missions
(last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
25. A latifundio can simply be defined as a large landed estate holders. See Thomas T.
Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social Function Doctrine and
Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 71 (2006).
26. Wilpert, supra note 16.
27. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA art. 307, translated
in http://www.constitucion.ve/constitucion viewen/view/ver_arbol.pag.
28. Wilpert, supra note 16.
29. DeLong, supra note 12.
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idle and to show [that their] farm has been illegally invaded. '30
Under the scope of article 307, President Chavez utilized his Decreto
power 31 to issue Decree Number 1546 or Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo
Agrario (Ley de Tierras), which essentially provides the means to expro-
priate land.32 According to Ley de Tierra, the size of a legal farm will
range from 100 to 5,000 hectares as determined by the land's respective
productivity.33 Additionally, Ley de Tierra authorizes the government to
tax any holding beyond threshold acres that is 80 percent idle and further
allows landless peasants to personally expropriate or adversely possess
idle land so long as they cultivate the under-utilized land.34 In an effort
to expedite the redistribution, "the decree also gives any citizen the right
to report idle or uncultivated land to the government. '35
Even though the initial result of this legislation is a transfer of property
rights from the rich to the powerless, the ultimate aims of Ley de Tierra
include "set[ing] limits on the size of landholdings, tax[ing] unused prop-
erty as an incentive to spur agricultural growth, redistribute[ing] unused,
primarily government owned land to peasant families and cooperatives
and, lastly, expropriat[ing] uncultivated and fallow land from large, pri-
vate estates for the purposes of redistribution. '36 Furthermore, in an ef-
fort to mitigate the effects of Dutch Disease, the new law hopes "to
double the share of agriculture in [Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] to 12
[percent] by 2007," essentially making Venezuela agriculturally self-suffi-
cient.37 While the expropriation aim is sparking the most attention and
controversy, 38 the Chavez administration continuously stresses its intent
to emulate the Homestead Act of the United States rather than the ex-
treme land distribution program of Cuba.39
Under the Homestead Act, any citizen of the United States that was
twenty-one years old or older was entitled to 160 acres of government
land; however, restrictions provided that the land could not be used for
speculation purposes or as debt collateral.40 The homesteader could only
receive a land patent once there was at least five years of "actual settle-
30. Landowner Spars With Caracas Over Ranch, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at A10.
31. Antonio Ramirez, An Introduction to Venezuelan Governmental Institutions and
Primary Legal Sources, GLOBALEX, May 2006, http://nyulawglobal.org/globalex/
venezuela.htm.
32. Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo Agrario [Decree with Rank of Law on Land and Agra-
rian Development] Gaceta Oficial de la Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela N'
37.323 del 13/11/2001, decreto N' 1546 del 09/11/2001, available at http://www.
monografias.com/trabajosl5/ley-tierras-venezuela/ley-tierras-venezuela.shtml.
33. Wilpert, supra note 11, at 108 (analyzing Ley de Tierra).
34. Id. (analyzing Ley de Tierra, art. 2(5)).
35. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 105-06 (analyzing Ley de Tierra, art. 37).
36. DeLong, supra note 12.
37. Wilpert, supra note 11, at 109.
38. Federico Fuentes, Venezuela: Land Reform Battle Deepens, GREEN LEFr WEEKLY,
Oct. 12, 2005, available at http://www.worldpress.org/print-article.cfm?articleid=
2281&dont=yes.
39. DeLong, supra note 12.
40. One-Hundred-and-Sixty Acre Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), amended by 35
Stat. 6 (1908) [hereinafter Homestead Acts].
2008]
596 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
ment and cultivation. 4 1 "[I1n Chavez's plan, only after three years may
the peasants obtain legal ownership of the land, and only then after they
have rendered it productive. '42 But unlike Venezuela's land distribution
program, the Homestead Act did not authorize the government to seize
land from private landowners.
The opposition, including many national labor organizations, has been
leading media campaigns lambasting the Chavez administration and its
position on property rights. 43 According to the Tichira State Cattler-
aisers Association and the Tdchira section of the Fedecimaras, one of
Venezuela's most powerful employers' organizations, "[tihe law is in-
terventionist. It imposes state control and ignores the right to property,
which is a fundamental human right."'4 4 Furthermore these groups specif-
ically criticize the land distribution program as "Castrocommunist" and
call it an example of the administration's defiant stance against funda-
mental rights and true democratic principles. 45 Still, President Chavez
reiterates the fact that "the war against latifundios is key to the revolu-
tion," and any subsequent seizure is a legitimate end for the cause.4 6
To help initiate this massive expropriation process, the government en-
acted the National Land Institute (INTI) "to determine ownership of
land and to redistribute it according to the land law."'47 To fulfill the
terms of its charter, the INTI works with the peasant farmers by provid-
ing them with agricultural knowledge and technology. 48 This approach
differs significantly from previous land reform distribution projects as
well as from land reform programs in different parts of the world. 49 Un-
like the "here[] [is] a plot of land . . . [g]ood luck" approach that was
synonymous with land reform programs in developing countries,50 the
Chavez administration is using the INTI to "tak[e] a much more activist
roll in the reform process than previous attempts at land reform. 5 1 Even
though a more proactive INTI provides peasant farmers greater opportu-
nity to succeed once land ownership is attained, critics fear greater land
41. DeLong, supra note 12 (analyzing Homestead Acts).
42. Id.
43. Fuentes, supra note 38.
44. Maurice Lemoine, Venezuela: The Promise of Land for the People, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Oct. 2003, http://mondediplo.com/2003/10/07venezuela.
45. Id.
46. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 105 (quoting Sibylla Brodzinsky, Squatters
Sit Tight as Land Revolution is Put to the Test in Venezuela, GUARDIAN (London),
Jan. 25, 2005, at 15).
47. Wilpert, supra note 11.
48. Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, Bienvenido al Portal Virtual del INDER -
Misi6n, http:/lwww.inder.gov.ve/inder_mision.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) [here-
inafter INDER Mission].
49. DeLong, supra note 12.
50. See Nick Dancaescu, Note, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 Fla. J. Int'l L. 615, 631
(2003) (noting that the lack of a subsistence program, all but guarantees the failure
of new farmers benefiting from Zimbabwe's land reform program); Penalver,
supra note 7, at 208-10 (demonstrating that the lack of an adequate farming assis-
tance program destroyed Cuba's chances of having a successful agrarian reform).
51. DeLong, supra note 12.
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expropriation by such a zealous organization, especially since "[f]ailure to
prove ownership is... complicated... and landowners see their bargain-
ing power heavily undermined .... ,52
C. PROBLEMS OF THE LAND REFORM THAT ARE
HINDERING THE LANDLESS PEASANT
While proponents of Venezuela's new land distribution program cham-
pion its progressive initiatives and are optimistic about its successful im-
plementation, its shortcomings are not only applicable to property rights
issues of current landowners.53 One of the biggest challenges facing the
INTI and threatening the viability of Mission Zamora is Venezuela's
weak legal infrastructure-specifically judicial issues relating to title reg-
istry.54 "In many countries of Latin America, frequently up to 50 percent
of cultivated land is untitled thus making it de facto open access." '55 One
of the main reasons for the current state of Venezuela's murky title sys-
tem stems from the original large landowners. 56 Throughout history,
Venezuelan landowners have expanded their territories beyond their
stated title. 57
Though part of the problem stems from the lack of an adequate survey-
ing procedure and the existence of irregular property boundaries, many
landowners have simply ignored the boundaries, especially since previous
administrations rarely enforced property rights violations. 58 Such a disre-
gard for property rights and title registry has exacerbated current prop-
erty claims, even when the chain of title can be proven.59 A landowner
might legitimately have purchased land, made improvements, and ob-
tained some form of title and still be subject to expropriation proceedings
if the original owner did not have proper title. 60 Moreover, many current
Venezuelan landowners-especially the indigent property owners-have
been satisfied with the absence of an effective titling and land registry
system.61 These landowners are content with their current state of pos-
session and see government development of a system for documenting
land ownership as an attempt to solicit property taxes and to enforce ad-
ditional legal responsibilities. 62
52. Marion Barbel, British Agro-Industrial Group Cedes Land to Venezuelan Govern-
ment, WORLD MKTS. CTR., Mar. 23, 2006.
53. Wilpert, supra note 16.
54. Id.
55. Vogelgesang, supra note 5, at 25.
56. Wilpert, supra note 11, at 14.
57. Id.
58. Vogelgesang, supra note 5, at 25.
59. Wilpert, supra note 16.
60. Id.
61. Teolinda Bolfvar Barreto, Obstacles to Legalization of Squatter Settlements in Vene-
zuela, LAND LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass.), May 2001, at
5, available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/238 LLI0105.pdf.
62. Id. at 5-6.
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The result of such a poor quality of land title registry makes "the ex-
propriation and redistribution of privately held land extremely difficult
and slow."'63 With Venezuela's title registry system in such disarray, many
worry that the INTI might simply assume that since clearing legitimate
titles would be too "difficult and conflictive, it [might] be easier to simply
declare any land holding over a certain size as illegal [or idle], regardless
of the land title documentation a landowner might have."'64 Some argue
that an alternative method of proof of ownership should be allowed. In a
country already plagued with violence and corruption, however, it is best
to require a title system least susceptible to fraud and
misrepresentation. 65
In addition to pervasive titling issues, most are mindful of the lawless-
ness and violence plaguing both sides of the land distribution program.
Even though article 89 of Ley de Tierra, which allowed "peasants to
preemptively [sic] occupy expropriable [sic] land (ocupacion previa)" un-
til the present landowners legally proved their ownership, was deemed
unconstitutional by the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Venezuelan Su-
preme Court], 66 many peasant leaders still assert their squatter's rights
and attempt to usurp the property rights of landowners. 67 As a result,
many peasant leaders have been killed by property owners and paramili-
tary mercenaries. 68 Thus, without control and order, fear will become the
ultimate factor used to determine whether Mission Zamora will succeed
or fail.
III. ANALYZING THE MERITS OF CHAVEZ'S LAND REFORM
MISSIONS: WILL THEY WORK?
While no single test or perspective could ever be used to validate or
invalidate an effective democratic program, Chief Justice Marshall pro-
vides an interesting framework to judge the viability of a program in its
respective constitutional context: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional" 69
Though speaking of course in the context of the Constitution of the
United States, Marshall's words can also be used to review the constitu-
tionality and sufficiency of legislation under the purview of the Constitu-
tion of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Marshall's test provides a
63. Wilpert, supra note 16.
64. Id.
65. Steven E. Hendrix, Myths of Property Rights, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 183,
187-92 (1995) (arguing that rather than requiring a static formal titling system, a
country should balance the expenses of creating a titling registry with increased
security with the existing documents used to evidence ownership to see if the bene-
fits outweigh the costs).
66. Wilpert, supra note 16.
67. DeLong, supra note 12.
68. Wilpert, supra note 11, at 10.
69. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
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good method not only to analyze the ends of the land reform program,
but more importantly, to analyze the means that President Chavez is
utilizing to achieve those ends.70 Few would argue that providing arable
land to impoverished farmers is not a legitimate end.71 It is the means
the INTI is using, however (seizing landholdings from the rich and excis-
ing additional taxes on unproductive lands, for example), that are spark-
ing controversy in the region.
A. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE: REASONS FOR LAND REFORM
Of the twenty-five million inhabitants of Venezuela, 75 percent own 6
percent of any form of property ownership in the country.72 It is the
extent of this disparity in land ownership that gives rise to necessary land
and agrarian reform in the region. Though an aggressive land reform dis-
tribution program may not be the only method available to curtail the
massive ownership gap,73 the current socioeconomic position of develop-
ing Latin American countries that are predominately agrarian, like Vene-
zuela, require drastic change in the form of a land redistribution
initiative.74 "Peasants invariably and persistently demand measures to
break the land monopoly that keeps property in the hands of an elite
which dominates political and economic life. '' 75 As such, land reform is
an inevitable process needed to equalize years of disproportionate land
ownership because "inequitable distribution of land will continue to levy
hidden costs in the form of income inequalities, nutritional deficiencies,
and social unrest."76
Recognizing the social turmoil of Latin America as well as the special
interests of American investors during the 1960s, President John F. Ken-
nedy established the Alliance for Progress to support any reform of the
70. One could argue that testing the constitutionality of these land reform programs is
pointless given the fact that the Chavez administration itself revised the Constitu-
tion of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, but Venezuela's Supreme Court is
monitoring the decrees and has already overruled some land reform laws for being
unconstitutional.
71. Opponents of any form of land distribution argue that uneducated peasants should
not receive land because they cannot manage property nor develop it as effectively
as large land holders. See William C. Thiesenhusen, Introduction: Searching for
Agrarian Reform in Latin America, in SEARCHING FOR AGRARIAN REFORM IN
LATIN AMERICA 1, 6 (William C. Thiesenhusen ed., 1989).
72. Wilpert, supra note 11, at 8.
73. "Countries sometimes pursue other alternatives, including distribution of or 'reset-
tlement' on uncultivated public lands, strict regulation of the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, or voluntary sale and purchase of land through 'land bank' or 'market-
assisted' mechanisms. Such alternatives can provide important benefits, but they
have rarely provided widespread beneficial impacts." Roy L. Prosterman & Tim
Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: New Challenges, New Re-
sponses, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 780 (2006).
74. Thiesenhusen, supra note 71, at 1.
75. PETER DORNER, LATIN AMERICAN LAND REFORMS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 4
(Univ. of Wis. Press 1992).
76. R. Albert Berry, Land Reform and the Adequacy of World Food Production, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF LAND REFORM 63, 80 (John D. Montgomery ed.
1984).
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social conditions in the region. 77 While the initial Communist threat is no
longer an issue in the region and the program itself is now merely a page
in history books, one of the tenets of the initial mission is still an issue in
Latin American countries like Venezuela:
To encourage, in accordance with the characteristics of each country,
programs of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective
transformation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of
land tenure and use with a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf
holdings by an equitable system of property so that, supplemented
by timely and adequate credit, technical assistance, and improved
marketing arrangements, the land will become, for the man who
works it, the basis of his economic stability, the foundation of his
increasing welfare, and the guarantee of his freedom and dignity.78
Therefore, even though past land reform programs in Venezuela have not
been successful, and current land reform programs in other regions of the
world are failing, 79 it is clear that a well-established and customized plan
will be the best means to achieve social and economic stability in
Venezuela. 80
1. Land Reform Defined
For most of the twentieth century, the dominant methodology for
conducting land reform in non-Marxist settings was compulsory ac-
quisition of defined lands from private landlords or plantation own-
ers, often at a sharp discount from market value, and redistribution
of such lands to tenant farmers or agricultural laborers in farms
whose size approximated that of small-to-medium sized farms in that
country. 81
While both harsh and contrary to the traditional notions of property
rights and ownership, pure land reform necessitates a balancing act be-
tween the fundamental rights of property ownership and the public func-
tion that ensures the social right to housing. 82 After balancing these
concerns, "[rlesearch confirms that a broad-based distribution of land as-
sets not only benefits the poor but becomes a solid basis for sustained and
inclusive economic growth. ' 83
In addition to the inherent costs attributed to the loss of property rights
as well as the logistical and financial resources required to undertake a
77. John D. Montgomery, United States Advocacy of International Land Reform, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF LAND REFORM 115, 119-20 (John D. Montgom-
ery, ed. 1984).
78. Organization of American States, Declaration OF PUNTA DEL ESTE, Aug. 17, 1961,
available at http://www.yale.edu/Iawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intaml5.htm#bl.
79. Prosterman & Hanstad, supra note 73, at 774.
80. Berry, supra note 76, at 70.
81. Prosterman & Hanstad, supra note 73, at 788.
82. Eddsio Fernandes & Martim 0. Smolka, Land Regularization and Upgrading Pro-
grams Revisted, LAND LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass.), Jul.
2004, at 18, available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/909_final_7_04.pdf.
83. Prosterman & Hanstad, supra note 73, at 770.
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land reform program on a national scale, the redistribution of land and
rights is a tremendously difficult government undertaking that necessarily
infringes on a nation's social, economic, and political positioning.84
"[Land reform] often involves reversal of local power balances and a
strengthening of regional forces that central governments perceive as
threats to their stability. ' 85 Difficulty in the reform transition further lies
in the trade-off of polar values coupled with the struggle in determining
the ultimate compromise between fundamental property rights and hu-
manitarian responsibilities. 86
2. The Socialist View of Land Reform
One theory that can be used to conceptualize the implications of a land
reform program as well as its respective principles is the Socialist Func-
tion Doctrine. "The modern Socialist Function Doctrine emerged in its
broadest context from the early twentieth-century writings of the French
jurist and political philosopher Leon Duguit, and posits that the legiti-
macy of government originates in the social functions promoted by gov-
ernment action. '8 7 At the outset of the Socialist Function Doctrine, one
must accept the premise that society, and more importantly the state gov-
ernment, must assume a greater role in developing programs to effectuate
positive social change. 88 More specifically, "[w]hen applied to real prop-
erty, the Socialist Function Doctrine operates to justify a fundamentally
distinct view of the role of property in society, and the rights and obliga-
tions of the individual holding property." 89
Along a continuum describing property rights, there are two extreme
views that merit a brief review when analyzing the Social Function Doc-
trine: the allodial model and the regalia model.90 "Allodial land is land
held in absolute ownership and which gives rise to no obligations on the
part of the owner to anyone else," including taxation and regulation. 91
On the other side of the property rights spectrum is the regalia model,
which holds "that all land originally belongs to the state."' 92 But this is not
an absolute right; "[t]he idea is not that the state has all of the rights of
ownership in all of the land, but rather that the recognition of private
84. DORNER, supra note 75, at 7.
85. Joseph S. Nye,Jr., Ethical Dimensions of International Involvement in Land Re-
form, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF LAND REFORM 7 (John D. Montgomery,
ed. 1984).
86. Id.
87. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 71.
88. Discussion Paper, Solon L. Barraclough, U.N. Research Inst. for Soc. Dev.
[RISD], Land Reform in Developing Countries: The Role of the State and Other




89. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 72.
90. Id. at 89-91.
91. Id. at 89-90.
92. Id. at 90-91.
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rights in land came originally from the state and properly depends for its
continuance upon the satisfaction of community needs. '93 Thus, while
property rights in land can be thought of as being derived from the sover-
eign, it is better to view this right as subject to the condition that the land
becomes cultivated; such land may revert back to the state if the cultiva-
tion condition is not satisfied. 94
Though no country adopts either model in its purest form, it is clear
that the Socialist Function Doctrine aligns with the allodial jurisprudence
on property rights. 95 But regardless of which model of property rights a
country adopts, government intervention and support is a key component
of the Socialist Function Doctrine and a necessary factor in a land or
agrarian reform. 96 "All states along the property rights continuum in-
clude policy justifications for limitations on property rights to benefit so-
ciety, including the physical expropriation of property under appropriate
circumstances." 97 On the other hand, one should also consider the neo-
liberal view on economic growth, which holds that socialist policy inter-
ventions will create disequilibrium between the classes. 98 Such a conse-
quence will materialize because the focus of the development policy, like
land reform, will be on achieving social equity rather than ensuring the
proper distribution of recourses to their best use. 99 Additionally, as ex-
pressed by the late Pope John Paul II, "to attain social justice, much more
is required than the simple application of ideological schemes ... such
as ... the invasion of lands . . . [or] the adoption of extreme technical
measures that can have much graver consequences than the injustice they
are meant to resolve." 1°°
By carrying land expropriations on lands deemed idle and uncultivated,
it is clear that the Chavez administration succumbs to the "socialist func-
tion" line of thinking. 10' Additionally, President Chavez himself asserts
that "the land expropriations are being carried out only for public use or
for social necessity.' 0 2 One need only look to article 115 of the Consti-
93. Kenneth L. Karst, Latin-American Land Reform: The Uses of Confiscation, 63
MICH. L. REV. 327, 356 (1964).
94. Id.
95. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 91.
96. KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 38
(World Bank & Oxford Univ. Press 2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.
orglexternalldefault/WDSContentServer/IW3PIB/200308/08/00094946_03072504
00474/additional/310436360_20050007001644.pdf.
97. For example, the United States, a staunch follower of the allodial model, allows
expropriation or eminent domain proceedings based on a "public purpose."
Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 96.
98. Int'l Land Coalition, Land Tenure Serv. In Rural Dev., Contemporary Thinking on
Land Reform, available at http://www.landcoalition.org/docs/odfaomonl.htm
[hereinafter Land Tenure Service].
99. Id.
100. Focusing on Latin America's New "Axis of Evil", 1 LULAWATCH 16 (Dec. 5,2003)
(quoting Pope John Paul II, Address to Brazilian Bishops on their ad limina visit
(Nov. 26, 2002)), available at http:llwww.tfp.org/lulawatch/dec05/l.htm.
101. DeLong, supra note 12.
102. Jens Erik Gould, Redistributing the Land, Hugo Chavez Style, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 13, 2005, at A13.
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tution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, however, to see the
State's ultimate position on the Socialist Function Doctrine as it pertains
to land reform: the expropriation of property will only occur "for reasons
of public utility or social interest.' 10 3 Thus, "state protection of private
property remains justified only insofar as its protection by the state fur-
thers the state obligation to ensure that property provides a 'social func-
tion."' 104 Once the property fails to satisfy that social function, the state
must seek a social intervention, like land reform, to curb "unrelenting
poverty and concomitant landlessness.' 10 5
B. ANALYSIS OF LAND REFORM PROGRAMS: CASE STUDIES
While "[m]ore fruitful exposition of [land reform] is probably based on
more contemporary experiences and in countries with similar extant insti-
tutions,"'10 6 a visual inspection of the land reform programs like Cuba and
Zimbabwe provides a spectrum that can be used to provide greater un-
derstanding of Venezuela's own land reform program.' 0 7 Like several
Latin American countries, Cuba is a country that has undergone numer-
ous political changes with the land reform policies to match. Simply
stated, Cuba's current land reform developments can best be described as
Marxist-community land sharing. On the other side of the land reform
spectrum is Zimbabwe. As a country in political and social turmoil, its
respective land reform program mirrors the surrounding economic insta-
bility and can be defined as a tyrannical land reform regime. These polar
land reform institutions provide a wide range of alternative land reform
programs to learn from-good or bad.
1. The Cuban Land Reform Model
In the 1960s, the drastic land ownership gap between the rich and the
poor in Cuba was very similar to present day Venezuela-with approxi-
mately 9.4 percent of land owners owning 73.3 percent of the land in
Cuba. 08 As a result of the disparate land gap, a deep chasm developed
between the standard of living of the urban and rural sectors, which exac-
erbated the financial drain from the rural to urban areas of Cuba. 10 9
These conditions, coupled with the increasing political uproar in the re-
gion, instigated the catalyst that set the revolutionary operation in mo-
tion. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, "the first and second Agrarian
Reform Laws [were implemented and] the Cuban state took control of
103. VENEZ. CONST. art. 115, translated in http://www.constitucion.ve/constitucionview
_en/view/verarbol.pag.
104. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 95.
105. Id. at 119.
106. Thiesenhusen, supra note 71, at 2.
107. Prosterman & Hanstad, supra note 73, at 780.
108. MAVIS ALVAREZ ET AL., LAND RESEARCH ACTION NETWORK, SURVIVING CRISIS
IN CUBA: THE SECOND AGRARIAN REFORM AND SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 5
(Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=337.
109. Penalver, supra note 7, at 113.
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more than 70 percent of the arable land and created the state sector in
agriculture"' 10 and the crusade against the rich and foreign investors was
born.
"Broadly speaking, the goals [of the Revolution] were a redistribution
of property[,] ... political reform, and greater independence from [U.S.]
domination."11' Additionally, part of the strategy was also diversification
of the agricultural sector by eliminating the vast sugar plantations owned
by U.S. companies and encouraging agricultural research, technological
implementation, and diversified agricultural cultivation." 2 In an effort to
instigate these goals, the First Agrarian Reform Law of May 17, 1959, was
enacted to eliminate the latifundia that characterized Cuba's agricultural
landscape as well as the foreign-owned sugar plantations. 1 3 While simi-
lar in purpose and reason, the land reform policies of Cuba differed
greatly from those of Venezuela in their underlying principles and
application.
For example, one of the significant means used to effectuate land re-
form in the Cuban model was the use of cooperative farming. 14 As
stated by Fidel Castro: "To maintain consumption, to maintain abun-
dance, to carry out agrarian reforms, the land cannot be distributed in
one million small pieces ... cooperatives must be established in the right
places for each type of production, and the crops to be sown must be
planned .... " 15 Thus, under the First Agrarian Reform Law, "recipients
of redistributed land were to be encouraged to form private agricultural
cooperatives." '"16 But since there were no infrastructural improvements
included in the law, many farmers were forced into these cooperatives for
fear of confiscation of uncultivated or underdeveloped arable land, even
though they might have been more successful as small independent
farmers."17
When the First Agrarian Reform Law failed to initiate the drastic re-
form sought by Fidel Castro, the Cuban government adopted a more ag-
gressive stance on agrarian and land reform. 18 The Second Agrarian
Reform Law of 1963 "was much more far-reaching than the first" agra-
rian reform law that enumerated social consumption and cooperative
farming aspects in its provisions. 1 9 The Cuban government added addi-
tional transferability restrictions on newly acquired farmlands and contin-
110. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 6.
111. Penalver, supra note 7, at 120.
112. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 7.
113. Penalver, supra note 7, at 122.
114. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 7-8.
115. Id. at 7 (quoting Fidel Castro, Closing Session of the First Farm Workers Congress
(Feb.1959)).
116. Penalver, supra note 7, at 123.
117. Id.
118. RICARDO A. PUERTA & Jost ALVAREZ, Ass'N FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN
ECON., ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF CUBAN AGRICULTURE AT DIFFER-
ENT LEVELS OF STATE INTERVENTION: PART I, http:/Ilanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/
asce/cuba3/puertal.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
119. Penalver, supra note 7, at 124-25.
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ually stressed cultivation of these lands. 120 For example, in order for
farmers to transfer land, they "must obtain state permission to sell their
land, and the state has the right to buy the land from the farmer for a
price fixed by law."'1 21 On a more extreme level, the Cuban government
even restricted the right of inheritance of these lands to family members
that have actually been working on the land for a fixed term of years. 122
The fall of the Soviet Bloc instigated a Third Agrarian Reform in Cuba,
which highlighted a clear shift in the socioeconomic climate in Cuba and
a change in the property ideology of years past.123 The events in Eastern
Europe exacerbated the "generalized decrease in yields and in other in-
dicators of efficiency in an important group of commodities" that defined
the Cuban agricultural viability. 124 As a result, Cuba began to allow the
private ownership of both commercial and industrial property, which sig-
nificantly reduced Cuba's role in the agricultural sector.125 While the
privatization of these sectors signaled Cuba's new advent towards agricul-
tural independence and property ownership, the Castro administration
remained committed to this sector by emphasizing agricultural research
and development. 12 6
To curtail the repressed state of the agricultural sector and the Cuban
economy as a whole, Cuba undertook a number of legal reforms to at-
tract foreign capital and to mitigate the negative land reform percep-
tions. 127 But "[t]he lack of an adequate legal system for real estate
development and mortgage lending in Cuba is a major obstacle to imple-
mentation of all these instruments."1 28 Moreover, these agricultural re-
forms focus on developing the agricultural economy without dealing with
issues like property ownership, compensation, and property rights. 129
Rather than changing the current state of land reform, the Cuban govern-
ment allowed individual farmers to join other farmers to develop their
lands in a cooperative-type endeavor (Cooperatives of Agricultural Pro-
duction) or, if large enough financially, the Cuban government allowed
120. Id. at 125.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 130.
124. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 8.
125. Penalver, supra note 7, at 130.
126. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 10.
127. Some of these changes include the amended Constitucion de la Republica de Cuba
in 1992 to increase private property protections; the passage of Ley No. 77 [The
Law on Foreign Investment] of 1995 to enable majority ownership in Cuban ven-
tures by foreign investors; and the passage of Decreto Ley No. 165 [Decree for
Duty-Free Zones and Industrial Parks] of 1996 and Decreto Ley No. 173 [Decree
for Banks and Non-Banking Financial Institutions] of 1997 to implement the in-
vestment foundation that would allow for foreign investment and development.
GARY M. SCHIFFMAN, CASTRO'S CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS 2, http://www.be.wvu.edu/div/econ/shiffman.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
128. Ricardo Ndfiez, et al., Using Land Value to Promote Development in Cuba, LAND
LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass.), Mar. 2000, at 2, available
at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dlU304 linc-landlines%203.00.pdf.
129. Penalver, supra note 7, at 135-36.
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investors the opportunity to develop certain commodities as a private
farm.130 Though independent in form, these non-State sector farms were
still subject to state control and restrictions such as forced sales to the
state procurement agency (acopio) and asset ownership by the acopio.13 1
While the shift in policy is welcoming for the foreign investor, it does not
address property rights and ownership, and thus fails to assure future in-
vestors and domestic farmers of security in their respective lands. 132
Both Venezuela and Cuba share much with respect to land reform his-
tory and policy; it is undeniable, however, that they differ in land reform
implementation and results. The agricultural focus of Cuba in recent
times "has undergone a positive transformation toward sustainability." 133
But an analysis of Cuba's agricultural productivity on a State farm versus
non-State farm level indicates that the private farmers are far more pro-
ductive and that they have the potential of being even more productive if
these private farmers were to own farmland free and clear of State inter-
ference. 134 Thus, while there are many positive developments resulting
from Cuba's land and agricultural reform, the absence of substantive
property reform and the "uncertain and unpredictable legal situation can
prevent the formation of serious business partnership, which normally re-
quire long-term vision, stability, and transparency." 135
2. The Zimbabwean Land Reform Model
On the other side of both the ocean and land reform spectrum is
Zimbabwe's fast-tract redistribution program. As a step-child of the
apartheid and colonialism era, Zimbabwe has endured decades of both
positive and negative political and economic periods. Zimbabwe's past
defined the extensive inequitable distribution of land between the de-
scendants of white colonists and the native blacks. In the 1980s, for ex-
ample, "700,000 black families lived on 16.2 million hectares, while 5,500
white farmers had rights to an almost equal 15.6 million hectares.' ' 36
These statistics are compounded by the fact that this "miniscule white
minority owns most . . . of the large commercial farms that support
130. PUERTA & ALVAREZ, supra note 118.
131. Id.
132. DANIEL MAXWELL & KEITH WIEBE, LAND TENURE CENTER, RESEARCH PAPER
No. 129, LAND TENURE AND FOOD SECURITY: A REVIEW OF CONCEPTS, EVI-
DENCE, AND METHODS 21 (1998), available at http://www.ies.wisc.edu/ltc/rp129.
html.
133. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 108, at 26.
134. RICARDO A. PUERTA & JOSt ALVAREZ, ASS'N FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN
ECON., ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF CUBAN AGRICULTURE AT DIFFER-
ENT LEVELS OF STATE INTERVENTION: PART IV, http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/
asce/cuba3/puerta4.html; see also RICARDO A. PUERTA & Jost ALVAREZ, ASS'N
FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON., ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF
CUBAN AGRICULTURE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF STATE INTERVENTION: PART III,
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba3/puerta3.html (providing a statistical
analysis of the productivity of State farms and non-State farms as well as the culti-
vation level of their respective property).
135. Ntifiez, supra note 128, at 2-3.
136. Dancaescu, supra note 50, at 619.
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Zimbabwe's agriculture-dependent economy."' 137 In addition to these re-
strictions on land ownership, black locals were relocated to resettlement
areas and forced to act as cheap labor on lands they could never legally
own. 138 These dramatic realizations can be attributed to the years of
British rule and the respective laws that prohibited local natives from
owning property. 139
While it is undeniable that the previous era of property law and dispro-
portionate land ownership merit revolutionary change, President Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe must be mindful of the human rights implications
for current land owners as well as the future beneficiaries of his land re-
form.140 The "[s]tate and para-state organizations [are using] hastily-cre-
ated laws, intimidation, and violence to chase away white farmers,
displace or intimidate tens of thousands of farm workers, and partition
commercial farms into small-scale or medium-scale holdings.' 41 But the
ultimate move occurred on May 23, 2000, when the Mugabe-backed gov-
ernment changed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, authorizing the req-
uisition of white-owned lands, regardless of their productivity level, while
only offering compensation "for any improvements on or to the land.' 142
Though the Zimbabwe Supreme Court overwhelmingly overruled the
amendment as unconstitutional, fear and intimidation caused a change in
the composition of the Supreme Court, and the newly Mugabe-appointed
Supreme Court quickly lifted the moratorium on Mugabe's fast-track
land resettlement program.' 43 Considering all these land reform policies,
it is clear that "the Mugabe regime ha[s] transformed from a democrati-
cally elected, responsible, and socially-minded government, to a semi-fas-
cist oligarchy, which still ha[s] done little for the rural poor."'144
While the social and economic welfare of a developing country is ar-
guably more important than individual rights, it is the responsibility of
countries like Zimbabwe to "strike a balance between individual and so-
cial interests" to ensure future prosperity for the rural class. 145 Even
Zimbabwean governmental officials acknowledge that not all land acqui-
137. John McClung Nading, Comment, Property Under Siege: The Legality of Land Re-
form in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 737, 750 (Fall 2002) (citing T.A.S.
Bowyer-Bower & Colin Stoneman, Land Reform's Constraints and Prospects: Poli-
cies, Perceptives and Ideologies in Zimbabwe Today, in Land Reform in Zimbabwe:
Constraints and Prospects, 1, 3 (T.A.S. Bowyer-Bower & Colin Stoneman eds.,
2000)).
138. Dancaescu, supra note 50, at 619.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 626.
141. Blair Rutherford, Africa: Looking In and Looking Out: The Rough Contours of
Land in Zimbabwe, 29 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 103, 104 (Summer
2005).
142. Dancaescu, supra note 50, at 621.
143. Id. at 622-23 (citing Zimbabwe Targets White-Owned Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29,
2001).
144. Id. at 623.
145. Nading, supra note 137, at 776-77.
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sitions have been legally expropriated or confirmed. 146 In contrast to
these developments, the Chavez administration recognizes the rights of
individuals as it tries to fulfill its social interests. 147 Unlike the fast-track
land resettlement, Mission Zamora and its progeny legitimize the rule of
law, 148 enable just compensation, 49 and facilitate ancillary programs with
the land reform. 50 Furthermore, the policy decisions of the Mugabe ad-
ministration have seriously exacerbated draught and natural disaster
problems and have further depressed agricultural productivity and for-
eign investment. 15'
With the widespread violence, political corruption, and socioeconomic
collapse in the region, it is clear that a policy shift in Zimbabwe's land
reform program is crucial. Just compensation must accompany expropri-
ated lands, regardless of history and current economic effects on the na-
tives. 52 And in spite of the final land expropriation program that is
adopted in Zimbabwe, its implementation should comport to democratic
principles of equity, transparency, and justice. 53 Finally, it is hopeful
that other countries will consider the staunch position of Zimbabwe as
they develop their own land distribution programs.' 54 For while the ends
may be legitimate, we must also be concerned with the means, for the
future of Zimbabwe and other countries will depend on its effects.
C. How CHAVEZ'S LAND REFORM PROGRAM COMPARES TO
OTHER PROGRAMS
Previous land reform systems in Latin America "suffered from such
factors as the poor quality of the land redistributed, insecure titles, a lack
of farming expertise on the part of the beneficiaries, plus a number of
policy distortions."'' 55 These land reform programs fail because they sim-
ply give the beneficiaries arable land without access to financial credit, a
sufficient marketplace, or technological assistance. 56 Other politically
motivated factors dooming previous Latin American land reforms in-
clude indiscriminate land takings, insufficient compensation, and the ab-
sence of any necessary land reform information. 157 Thus, while private
property is not always an absolute right, "[t]he key to protecting individ-
146. According to Zimbabwe's Minister of Special Affairs in the President's Office Re-
sponsible for Lands, Land Reform, and Resettlement, over 86% of the farms that
have been acquired are not yet "confirmed." This means that these lands have not
been legally acknowledged by the government. Rutherford, supra note 141, at 105.
147. Wilpert, supra note 16.
148. See infra note 253.
149. See infra note 252.
150. See infra note 175.
151. Nading, supra note 137, at 751-53.
152. Id. at 783.
153. Rutherford, supra note 141, at 111.
154. Dancaescu, supra note 50, at 642.
155. Vogelgesang, supra note 5, at 22.
156. Marc Becker, Land Reform in Venezuela, GLOBAL EXCHANGE 1 (2004), http://
www.venezuelanalysis.com/acrobat-files/vz-and-indigenous-rights.pdf.
157. DORNER, supra note 75, at 57.
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ual rights to property lies in political institutions, which require that rules
be reasonable and not arbitrary, necessary for the purposed imposed, and
carried out by due process of law."' 58
With Venezuela's current land reform focused on the redistribution of
land as well as its productivity, President Chavez is doing more than just
handing out titles. Simply stated, the twin aims of Mission Zamora can
be summarized as "the creation of greater social justice and the establish-
ment of food self-sufficiency in Venezuela."' 159 Moreover, by including
"de facto government ownership of the distributed land, dissemination of
knowledge about proper farming techniques to the new peasant coopera-
tives, and ... the creation of internal and external markets [that are]
required to absorb the new products" in the land reform process, the
Chavez administration is directly combating the failures of previous land
reforms attempted by other administrations in Venezuela.' 60
1. Restricting the Transferability of Newly Distributed Land
Rural poverty is a product of the peasants' inability to control, develop,
and transfer income-generating assets. 161 With access to land and the
rights to control and transfer that land, low income farmers will have the
opportunity to enhance the value of their endowment and subsequently
increase their bargaining power. 162 But unfettered access to property
rights by the land reform beneficiaries may result in an opposite outcome,
especially if the indigent become financially desperate or if they are ex-
ploited by large landowners or institutional creditors. 63
For example, in an attempt to curb formerly-landless peasants selling
their newly acquired lands back to the large landowners, the INTI will
hold the land title in an escrow account for three years. 164 Once three
years have passed, with the new landowner living and cultivating the land
during that time period, title will pass to the landowner free from any
government enacted restrictions that initially made the land inaliena-
ble. 165 According to critics of the Chavez administration, these govern-
ment restrictions on land transfers are tantamount to providing only
licenses to farm the land, rather than actual ownership of it. 166 Moreo-
ver, excessive restrictions on the alienability of land may actually burden
the new farmers more, 167 especially since they will be deprived of access
to credit to improve their land and expand its size when it is economically
158. Id.
159. Wilpert, supra note 16.
160. DeLong, supra note 12.
161. A. Alain de Janvry & E. Sadoulet, Seven Theses in Support of Successful Rural
Development, in LAND REFORM BULLETIN: 1996 (1996), available at http://www.
fao.org/sd/LTdirect/LR96/dejan.htm.
162. DEININGER, supra note 96, at xl.
163. Wilpert, supra note 16.
164. Delong, supra note 12.
165. Id.
166. Gould, supra note 102.
167. Wilpert, supra note 16 (quoting Olivier Delahaye).
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prudent. 168 Desperate farmers will have to resort to selling their farm-
land at 40 to 60 percent below its fair market value on the black market
due to the government restrictions currently in place. 169 And with poor
farmers having to sell their land at such a low level, such a provision
made to assist the destitute will unintentionally "lead to making poor
farmers even poorer than they otherwise would be." 170
According to the World Bank, governmental restrictions on the trans-
ferability of land can often stifle access to credit and thus have an adverse
effect on the credit market. 17' Additionally, "secure land rights that are
transferable also acquire a predictable market value and can be used as
collateral, 'cashed out' for non-agricultural investment or retirement, or
passed on as a wealth to the next generation."'172 While "[sluch restric-
tions can have perverse results even if they are intended to 'protect' the
beneficiaries,"'1 73 theories, like the Socialist Doctrine, provide that it is
better to restrict the rights of the despot in order to benefit them in the
future. 174
2. Establishing Supplemental Institutions to Facilitate Post-Land
Reform Growth
The critical stage of land redistribution, which determines the viability
of a land and agrarian reform program, is the point at which the landless
peasant actually takes possession and tries to utilize the available support
services.' 75 An inexperienced arable property owner lacks the knowl-
edge and resources to develop his land without any external assistance.
Furthermore, "[e]xperience has shown us that the lack of operational ca-
pacity or unscrupulous behavior of authorities when managing existing
resources is frequently a critical impediment that affects the development
and execution of good projects."'1 76 The tools provided by the govern-
ment to the people will determine the success of the land reform and the
agricultural sector as a whole.1 77
168. Prosterman & Hanstad, supra note 73, at 785.
169. Wilpert, supra note 11, at 9.
170. Wilpert, supra note 16.
171. DEININGER, supra note 96, at 37.
172. Prosterman & Hanstad, supra note 73, at 772.
173. Id. at 785.
174. Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 25, at 105-06.
175. ERIC B. SHEARER ET AL., LAND TENURE CENTER, LTC PAPER No. 141, THE RE-
FORM OF RURAL LAND MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RE-
SEARCH, THEORY, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 4 (1991), available at http://www.ies.
wisc.edu/ltc/ltcl4l.html.
176. Martim 0. Smolka & Laura Mullahy, Land Policies Across Geography and 7me:
Lessons from Latin America, LAND LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Cam-
bridge, Mass.), Jan. 2007, at 2, available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1181
Land %20Lines%20January%202007.pdf.
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Preventive of Humanitarian Emergencies 3 (Inst. for Policy Analysis Univ. of To-
ronto, Working Paper No. UT-ECIPA-BERRY2-98-03, 1998), available at http://
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In an effort to minimize the perceptions that "[e]conomies of scale in
terms of technology, credit markets, labor supervision, and labor markets
are affecting the historically inverse relationship . . . [that] eliminate[es]
the advantages of breaking up large estates,"'1 78 President Chavez estab-
lished the National Rural Development Institute (INDER) under the
mandate of article 307 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, which enables the government to "promote associative and
private forms of property in such manner as to guarantee agricultural
production.' 79 "To ensure success of the reform and productive use of
the land, land reform needs to be combined with other programs at the
government's disposal."' 80 Therefore, the Chavez administration specifi-
cally authorized INDER to develop Venezuela's agricultural infrastruc-
ture while working with the other institutions created under the gamut of
Mission Zamora. 181 As part of its mission, INDER provides effective
and efficient services to enhance the wellbeing of struggling farmers
through scientific and technological innovations. 182
Despite the fact that INDER is authorized to rehabilitate the agricul-
tural infrastructure and eliminate the barriers that are hindering poor
farmers, 183 INDER has been slow in implementing adequate drainage
and irrigation systems. 184 Many critics, including a number of peasant
farmer leaders, accuse the central government of paying little attention to
infrastructure development and the instrumentalities necessary to sup-
port continuous land reform growth, "in favor of the more controversial
and visible land redistribution aspect[s]" of Mission Zamora. 85 On the
other hand, INDER has successfully managed over twenty-two irrigation
system projects, thirty-three agricultural road projects, and eighteen
projects geared toward basic services and support for production in 2005
alone.' 86 Additionally, "[r]esearch has long pointed to the need for a
careful and differentiated approach as a precondition for making clear
policy recommendations in relation to land that can help improve both
efficiency and equity." 187
In addition to the institutions developed for the purpose of revitalizing
Venezuela's agriculture directly, the Chavez administration has estab-
lished an indirect program aimed at the agricultural marketplace. The
Venezuelan Agrarian Corporation (CVA) "helps farmers and coopera-
tives that benefited from the land reform to bring their products to mar-
178. Hendrix, supra note 65, at 217-18.
179. VENEZ. CONST. art. 307.
180. DEININGER, supra note 96, at 40.
181. Wilpert, supra note 16.
182. INDER Mission, supra note 48.
183. Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, Bienvenido al Portal Virtual del INDER -
ZQuidnes Somos?, http://www.inder.gov.ve/inder-quienes-somos.htm (last visited
Mar. 6, 2007).
184. Wilpert, supra note 16.
185. Id.
186. Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, Bienvenido al Portal Virtual del INDER -
Logros, http://www.inder.gov.ve/inderlogros-0l.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
187. DEININGER, supra note 96, at 17.
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ket."'188 The CVA is a conglomeration of state-owned enterprises that
sells both domestic and imported fungible goods, like agriculture, to the
people.189 The CVA works with other entities, including CASA
(Corporaci6n de Abastecimiento y Servicios Agrfcolas) and MERCAL
(Mercado de Alimentos), to establish the marketplace for peasant farm-
ers. 190 Though initially established to provide a food distribution channel
for the impoverished purchaser, 91 these entities are essential for the sur-
vival of peasant farmers in a post-Dutch Disease Venezuelan economy.1 92
Due in part to these and other programs established under the presidency
of Hugo Chavez, since 2005 "agricultural production in Venezuela has
increased from about 5 percent to 6 percent, as a percentage of GDP."'193
Thus, although the land reform programs that were instigated to facilitate
agricultural infrastructure and development failed to meet expectations,
Venezuela's commitment to these supplemental programs demonstrates a
greater possibility of success and agricultural growth.1 94
3. Providing Credit to Peasant Farmers
"The majority of the landless and land-poor do not have savings or
access to the financial resources required to convert an economic desire
to own land into effective demand."' 95 Access to credit is a vital compo-
nent of agricultural productivity since financial support determines the
type of crop the farmer will be willing to invest in.' 96 For example, credit
further enables a farmer's access to working capital and also acts as an
insurance substitute. 197 Once the harvest is cultivated, the farmer will
have the finances to pay off the loan. 98 Without these funds, however,
peasant farmers will not have access to essential agricultural technologies
like fertilizer, pesticides, hybrid seeds, and other capital equipment. 199
188. Wilpert, supra note 16.
189. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE 2006 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 691 (2006), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/ReportsPublications/2006/2006NTE-Report/
asset-upload file929 9220.pdf.
190. Id. at 691.
191. Id.
192. Wilpert, supra note 16.
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the Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty, a coalition of civil-society
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More than that, as is evident in Brazil's land reform program, these credit
transactions will also increase monetary transactions in the local econo-
mies and further other local-level economic benchmarks. 2°°
But the absence of a stable credit market presents another hurtle for
peasants with newly acquired land to maneuver, as they lack the ability to
solicit funds to develop the land.20 1 "The transition from subsistence to
money or market economy ... requires some capital investment which
the small agricultural producer in general cannot materialize out of his
own resources. '20 2 While the privatization of the credit market may be
the ideal form in a free-market vacuum, creditors lack the ability to
repossess any collateral in land, should a small farmer fail to satisfy his
debt obligations. 20 3 This is important because "making land marketable
provides a basis for using it as collateral in credit markets.120" Since the
Venezuelan government has transferability restrictions on redistributed
farmland, the transaction costs associated with providing credit to small
farmers will be too high for a private creditor, and subsequently not
worth the risk. 205 Such a realization will be detrimental to these farmers
as they will not have any other means of financing for land
development. 206
While many critics, including land reform economists, argue that re-
strictions on the transferability of property title will in fact worsen the
productivity of land,20 7 the INTI utilized its mandate under article 307 of
the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to provide
credit to peasants that do not hold full title.208 Realizing that it takes
money to make money, and more importantly, it takes money to cultivate
a farm, the Chavez administration has instigated a mechanism providing
financial resources to the beneficiaries of his land reform program. 209 For
example, in addition to receiving title to newly redistributed lands, peas-
ant farmers will receive access to cheap credit courtesy of the INTI.210
Such an institutional credit enabling program is essential because "the
security and equitable functioning of institutions dealing with land mar-
kets, credit, and property relations cannot be left solely to local
200. B. Heredia et al., Regional Impacts of Land Reform in Brazil, in LAND RE-
FORM-LAND SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATIVES 20 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.fao.
org/docrep/fao/008/y7218t/y7218t00.pdf.
201. MEYER, supra note 197, at 5.
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Mar. 6, 2007).
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jurisdictions. '211
Additionally, in an effort to mitigate the increasing technological costs
of agriculture, which prohibits thousands of property owners from farm-
ing the little land they do have, the INTI established local government
programs to allow for training and economic assistance.212 According to
the International Land Coalition (ILC), a plan of action must be insti-
tuted at a national level in order to address the massive level of credit
needed by these new farmers. 213 Furthermore, in relation to the adminis-
tration process of the credit, the program should be simple and decentral-
ized and the program should focus on easy communication between the
credit program, other land reform administrations, and the farmers them-
selves. 214 With these considerations in mind, it is the responsibility of the
government to provide low income farmers with access to credit in order
to equalize the disparity between the institutional farmers, who can ob-
tain financing to cultivate, and the small farmers, who lack the capacity to
solicit funding and to develop their plots of land.215
4. Repairing the Method of Recording Land Titles
To ensure successful land reform sustainability, the INTI must also de-
velop the physical and technical infrastructure related to property
rights.216 While "[tlhe methodology of land formalization should reflect
national conditions,' 21 7 a developing country needs to fix the method of
titling and land registry it uses to record the titles of newly acquired prop-
erty rights as well as the titles of current landowners because "[i]t is prac-
tically impossible to have an effective land market ... without good land
records. ' 218 Furthermore, "farmers are generally unwilling to invest their
resources and efforts to improve their land and living conditions to the
optimum desired unless they can feel secure in their legal status over the
land. ' 219 Thus, an emphasis on the land registry will effectuate land se-
curity, stimulate foreign and domestic property investment, provide
211. PETER DORNER, U.N. RESEARCH INST. FOR Soc. DEV., TECHNOLOGY AND
GLOBALIZATION: MODERN-ERA CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL INITIATIVES FOR LAND
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greater access to credit, and can increase overall land value.220
Many countries in Latin America, including Venezuela, have land reg-
istry systems in place but are particularly ineffective since the registries
lack "the capacity to find, recognize, organize, and above all interpret"
the stored data.22' The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) recommends the following objectives a developing coun-
try should consider when developing a land information management
system:
1) overcoming institutional barriers that currently create duplication
of information collection and management;
2) developing common standards for quality and format to ensure
information can be shared with confidence;
3) ensuring that these standards are achievable given the existing
economic, technological, institutional, and other constraints;
4) clarifying land policy objectives . . . and legislation in order to
focus, in the short term, on the minimum set of data required to sup-
port the policy;
5) ensuring that the data collected and stored have an economic
value to users, which in turn will help provide financial resources for
keeping information up-to-date and relevant; [and]
6) ensuring that decisions on such issues as confidentiality, security,
equity of access to information, and pricing strategies are clarified
and not in conflict with each other or with other policies.222
In addition to these objectives, the Chavez administration must balance
the cost of implementing a new land registry system and the added land
security it provides with the current state of the "existing documents
which ... evidence ownership rights and interests. '223 By utilizing these
objectives, Venezuela can create a titling system that will increase inves-
tor confidence to continue to invest in agriculture and provide a user-
friendly method for the common farmer to transfer title in his or her
land.224 Furthermore, there is evidentiary support for the proposition
that titling has a positive economic effect-for example, "[i]n Venezuela,
from 1965 to 2000 the prices of land in informal markets were consist-
ently between 40 to 60 percent lower than the prices for titled land." 225
220. PETER M. WARD, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, LAND REGULARIZATION IN
LATIN AMERICA: LESSONS IN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC POLICY 4,
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As the land registration system in Venezuela currently stands, no ag-
gressive effort towards revamping the titling procedures are in place. On
the contrary, a present landowner must prove ownership by utilizing the
previously ineffective land registry that is causing the uncertainty in the
current ownership of land in rural regions. 226 A landowner must offer
the INTI a property description that is detailed and provides an explicit
timeline of property transfers-dating back to 1847-in order to prove
that the lands are not illegally acquired government lands.227 Further-
more, landowners must also demonstrate that their land is being culti-
vated and used productively. 228 According to Eliezer Otaiza, the head of
the INTI: "If [the landowner is] not being productive with the land and
cannot show definite chain of ownership, [they are] done." 229
In the meantime, "some citizen groups in Venezuela have developed a
system of alternative titles (titulos supletorios) that derive from the exis-
tence of a dual legal structure. '230 Essentially, alternative titles are affi-
davits whereby the purported property owner submits a sworn claim
before a judge maintaining that they are the rightful landowner. 231 Full
legal title still trumps a titulo supletorio, but the likelihood of such a claim
in a non-litigious society such as Venezuela is remote at best.232 While
the perpetuation of conflicting property titles is the hallmark of an inef-
fective recordation system, "[t]hese parallel titles serve ...as effective
claims deriving from a plural legal system that seems to work rather well
in this particular context. '233 But by expropriating lands based on the old
land registry system while passively addressing the need for a more effec-
tive system, land investment in Venezuela may continue to dissipate as
investors lose confidence in the institutional land registry currently in
place.234
5. Public Perception and Political Support for Land Reform
For many, the term "land reform" connotes negative impressions like
violence, revolutions, public corruption, and the ultimate sin against
property rights.2 35 As such, it is the responsibility of the governing body
to advertise the benefits of the land reform program and to address any
potential concerns.236 For example, in an effort to solicit participation in
a grassroots registry reform, Peru successfully implemented a broad-
based public awareness campaign aimed at communicating the program's
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benefits and scope of execution. 237 It is clear that building widespread
grassroots support is an essential component in a land reform program
that is often overlooked and underestimated. 238 For that reason, Presi-
dent Chavez will need to consider media relations as well as public dis-
semination of information regarding his land reform project, especially in
a new age of communications technology. 239
Even though the land reform administrators will need to address their
media campaigns to land reform dissenters, the campaigns should also
include publication "of the land reform program and [the] beneficiaries'
rights at the local level using local media and other means that will effec-
tively communicate such information. '240 Such a widespread dissemina-
tion of rules and procedures as part of the land reform is especially
critical when implementing the registry system and the actual land redis-
tribution. 241 By failing to provide information such as application in-
structions to the actual beneficiaries of the land reform, Venezuela will
fail to break the poverty cycle it is trying to redress. 242
Other significant issues facing land reform are acts of violence and in-
timidation. Present day Venezuela is in the midst of negative advertising
campaigns, violent demonstrations, and a seemingly biased flow of infor-
mation from the government itself. In an action of clear defiance, the
president of Fedecimaras (a large employers' federation group) publicly
ripped up a copy of Ley de Tierra in front of demonstrators and on live
television.243 But even more startling are the acts of violence and assassi-
nations motivated by the land reform. For instance, the National Agricul-
tural Coordinator Ezequiel Zamora (CANEZ), a coalition of pro-
government peasant groups, reports that there have been over 130 assas-
sinations of peasant leaders since 2005.244 While a media campaign alone
will not curtail these acts of brutality, "[m]any of the past century's most
violent civil conflicts ensued when land issues were ignored. '245 Thus,
Venezuela should continue to address aggressive acts of the opposition
and continue to disseminate valuable information to the beneficiaries of
the land reform.
6. Just Compensation for Expropriated Property
In the event that expropriation of property occurs, it is widely accepted
that some form of compensation is warranted. 246 In general, there are
three basic elements used to validate fair expropriation procedures: ex-
237. Id. (citing J. McLaughlin & D. Palmer, Land Registration and Development, ITC
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propriations must be for some legitimate public purpose; such expropria-
tions need to be implemented uniformly and nondiscriminatory; and
some form of compensation must be given for any property taken. 247 De-
spite the fairness of compensation itself, compensating former landown-
ers will often determine the successful implementation of a land reform
program.248 For example, by offering adequate compensation for expro-
priated private property, the government will placate former landowners
and "help legitimize reform for significant sectors of public opinion,
thereby substantially reducing the amount of grassroots pressure" pushed
by the opposition. 249 Given the bloodshed of past land reforms, it is clear
that reasonable compensation to private landowners is a vital component
of land expropriation. 250
While the seizure of private property necessitates some form of com-
pensation, issues regarding the source of these funds merit notice.25'
Since the impoverished farmer will not have the ability to pay for recently
acquired lands, the government will bear the burden of paying the owner
of confiscated land.2 52 To prevent abuse and the peasant's reliance on
government assistance, "beneficiaries should also be required to repay
the government something for land. ' 253 With such a burdensome under-
taking, developing countries may need to consult different methods of
just compensation.25 4 In Cuba, for example, the government has the op-
tion of issuing bonds and can determine compensation from the value of
land by using tax records. 255 In the end, a country has the discretion to
decide how it will compensate expropriated land; in making that decision,
however, every country should consider "both market value and the flow
of income from the land" as factors to just compensation. 256
Even though many large estate-holders fear for their entitlements to
land, Venezuela provides that lands that are legally documented and cul-
tivated will be protected under the law.257 As such, "if the [Venezuelan]
government expropriates it for redistribution, then it must compensate
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legitimate landowners at current market rates for this land. '258 Further-
more, this position on just compensation is endorsed by the Venezuelan
Supreme Court, which overruled article 90 of Ley de Tierra for not re-
quiring the government to provide any compensation for expropriated
property. 259 In conclusion, by requiring a form of compensation for ex-
propriated lands, Venezuela will prevent "deleterious effects" on its econ-
omy and avoid social conflict among the classes.260
IV. CONCLUSION
After many years of uncertainty and frustration, the Vestey Group fi-
nally formalized an agreement with the INTI.261 While both sides appear
pleased with "the financially compensated land transfer," it is not clear
how future negotiations with other land owners will fair or what the over-
all implications will be on foreign investment.262 President Chavez and
his Mission Zamora program have been subject to severe criticism and
ridicule. Property rights advocates and foreign investors remain fearful
about the state of the latifundio in the near future. Although it is appar-
ent that President Chavez is willing to continue financial relationships
with foreign investors and their respective landholdings, it is unclear how
severe his war on the latifundios will be.
Looking back at previous land reform initiatives developed in Vene-
zuela, it is obvious that Mission Zamora will have a lasting effect on
Venezuelans-either positive or negative. Closely correlated to the land
reform program recommendations outlined in this article, Venezuela has
the opportunity to change the negative perceptions cast down on land
reform programs. Furthermore, after comparing Mission Zamora to the
land reform programs of Zimbabwe and Cuba, and by analyzing its poli-
cies under the guise of the Socialist Function Doctrine, developing coun-
tries in Latin America will have a tangible means of evaluating their land
distribution programs and will be able to take note of the advantages and
disadvantages under each system. "Land reform creates more secure and
self-confident producers who are willing to challenge the inertia, elitism,
and neglect that frequently characterize the politics of underdevelop-
ment.' '263 By administering the land reform program transparently, con-
sistently, and efficiently, the Chavez administration can use Mission
Zamora to ensure a result the previous regimes failed to provide-a
promising future for the landless peasant.
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